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Principled Criminal Law Reform: Could Macaulay Survive the Age 
of Governing through Crime1 
 






In response to the detailed discussion of histories and characteristics of codification described in the 
chapters of this book, these thoughts are designed to identify essential challenges to principled law 
reform. It is conceded that the political imperatives and pragmatic control agendas driving 
contemporary criminal law and procedure are more influential in constructing future directions for 
liability and sanction determinations than the integrity of a principled approach to criminal law, 
codified or otherwise. 
 
The intention of these reflections is to briefly and thematically examine the fate of principled law 
reform in modern criminal jurisdictions. In so doing, codification, and Macaulay’s code for India 
as an exemplar are reflected against the inconsistent expediency of contemporary criminal law 
reform. The political utility of the penal sanction in an era of ‘governing through crime’ is 
suggested as the reason why criminal law as we know it may be a ‘lost cause’. 
 
Why is it that more than 150 years on, Macaulay’s criminal code would, if presented today, be 
nothing less than a model of principled law reform despite its roots in early 19th century legal 
theory and British imperial concerns? In his chapter Chris Clarkson identifies the state of 
codification in the contemporary criminal law and process of England and Wales as a ‘tale of 
woe’. Despite a brighter picture being painted by Matthew Goode as to the state of codification 
in Australian Commonwealth law, the take up rate for the model Criminal Code in vital state and 
territory legislation is, he admits, sporadic at best. How might we explain the radical aversion to 
criminal law codification in current common law law-making? 
 
The anti-codification environment cannot be explained through any political reluctance to 
explore the utility of the penal sanction. Quite the contrary! We live in an age where, up until the 
cost-benefit critique on government in the wake of global financial collapse, the industries of 
criminal justice such as surveillance and risk assessment are flourishing under an aggressive 
political sponsorship and a punitive popular wisdom. Parliaments and their bureaucracies spend 
more time legislating and institutionalizing the penal sanction, than any other regulatory form at 
their disposal. Bob Sullivan critiques the burgeoning of a prophylactic criminal law through a 
radical reliance on strict liability offences and civil sanctions that short-circuit even the most 
meager remaining protections of criminal justice due process. Protective orders, preventive 
detention, confiscation of assets and the assertion of victim interests have been manifest through 
an explosion of patchy micro-reform which has left the criminal law even in code states devoid 
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of consistency and predictable principle. Attacks on the principles which would underlie any 
codified ‘General Part’ are a feature of present day ‘law and order’ legislative activity. Strict and 
absolute liability rejections of subjective responsibility, omissions and duty founding criminal 
conduct and constructing causation, and reverse onus provisions for exculpation, are just some of 
the legislative rush from foundational features of traditional criminal justice. And as Michael Hor 
notes regarding joint criminal enterprise, activist judicial interpretation has complimented moves 
away from subjective fault.  
 
Additional impediments against a codification sentiment in contemporary politicized criminal 
law reform are the rejection of central considerations behind the code project, identified in Neil 
Morgan’s chapter as the jewels in Macaulay’s crown. Symmetry, simplicity and consistent 
subjective standards of liability cannot be found even in the conservative and protectionist 
atmosphere of criminal justice law-making. Defences have largely contracted in scope, coverage 
and application under the oppression of the reasonable person and even in the face of efforts to 
return their scope through judicial activism. Stanley Yeo reviews the incompatible applications 
of necessity and duress. The lawful use of force through the private defence, of excessive self 
defence and the protection of house-holder property (Cheah Wui Ling) when looked at against 
the demise of provocation (Ian Leader-Elliot), and the other restrictive excuses (Gerry Ferguson) 
tend to confound the search for a consistent calcification of factors effecting liability. Macaulay 
achieved what centuries of legislative and judicial intervention have unraveled. Why so? 
 
Perhaps the worry for codification advocates exists in the project itself. Macaulay’s code is 
adept, carefully theorized, consistent, liberal in the true sense and, above all else, inviolate. There 
is also irony here in that concerns about effective and legitimate criminal law helped to make 
Macaulay’s code a legislative priority, a pattern also seen in the enactment of other 19th century 
British jurisdiction codes that stamped imperial outreach as much as trade or military interests. 
Its translation into the Indian Penal Code and its more recent colonial derivatives demonstrates 
the power of political expedience over the beauty of an artful code. Even if Macaulay’s intent 
and construction had survived its first major legislative incarnation, it would have faced the 
challenges against change. Without systematic re-codification particularly in a changing 
international rights environment (Cheah Wui Ling; Ian Leader-Elliot), codes are barriers to 
reform in themselves. Integrity fights dynamism in the same way it is poisoned by tortuous and 
ill-conceived political expediency. 
 
What are these challenges to change (codified or otherwise) towards a rational criminal law? 
They include the following, to mention a few: 
 
 The disconnection between what principle endorses and legislators do; 
 The often irrational connection between community aspiration, political fear-mongering 
and legal limits; 
 The tensions on the apparatus of the criminal law because of increasing preventive and 
prophylactic encroachments; 
 The monopoly of the state over the penal sanction (through investigation, prosecution and 
punishment) alienating the parties perpetrating and suffering harm, and who would 
otherwise have a strong interest on real and predictable, rather than didactic and 
normative outcomes, resulting from this tether to the state; 




 Arcane connections with institutional and process frameworks preceding even Macaulay; 
 The unhealthy and de-historicised modern alliance between the criminal law and 
Austinian sovereignty when in their earlier incarnations the principles on which the 
criminal law rests were a specific and operational break on state power; 
 The contemporary use of the criminal law through a proliferation of regulatory offences 
and civil penalty options, against the otherwise law-abiding community; and 
 The obsession with appellate case law rather than legislative activism as the scholarship 
of criminal law, thus proliferating the judicial rationalist rather than legislative pragmatist 
perspective. 
 
The answer to institutional myopia, if not to political capture, lies in both a recognition of the 
value of codification and a routine and rigorous commitment to re-codification. Perhaps, 
however, as Bob Sullivan suggests, with the regrettable developments in criminal conduct 
conceptualizing, fundamental questions need to precede a codification commitment about the 
modern concept of crime, and what theory, if any, informs the purpose of the criminal law. 
 
It could be said about the current era of governing through crime that the normative informs the 
substantive and depends on (and directs) the procedural dimensions. In reality, the legislative 
purpose is in reverse. The necessity to translate political interest into regulatory form turns what 
Bentham hoped for a legislative science into a technology of short-term governance. To return to 
the conditions of the science the codification project needs to be imagined against the contexts 
of: 
 
 The nature and significance of harm, pre-determining and constraining fault; 
 The manner in which the accused has ‘wronged’ the victim; 
 The extent to which the accused acts with knowledge, intent or emotional disturbance 
to explain his or her responsibility for the ‘wrong’ (both from the perspective of 
culpability and excuse); 
 Appropriateness of the predictive and preventive functions of the law; and 
 The need to shake free of confusing and pre-existing legislative technologies (such as 
attempt, causation, common purpose). 
 
It could be said that codification as a practical tool for justice relies as much on considerations of 
proof, as it does on semantic debates about justice and form. Having the General Part settled 
around default offences and defences might assist in this recognition. Macaulay’s Benthamite 
rejection of judicial re-interpretation of principle, puts the challenge back to the codifiers to 
achieve a dynamic language for the law, which is community sensitive and flexible in facing the 
demands of modernity, while resilient to expedient modification of core principles. Hence, the 
need for contemporary codification projects to properly reflect rights and the rule of law when 
considering the harm and responsibility from serious wrong. 
 
As the era of governing through crime demonstrates in legislative activity, the principles of 
criminal law are at their most vulnerable when determined as being at odds with the control 
function of governability. It is one thing for politicians to ignore essential historical reflection 
about the role of criminal justice in resisting the excesses of the state. However, legislative 
reformers and some criminal law scholars seem more interested in making sharper the 




governance application of the criminal law, and ignoring its essence in restricting rather than 
facilitating state power and authority.  
 
This incapacity to see the criminal law as an active element in ‘separation of powers’ and its 
critical importance to the rule of law and constitutional legality is evidenced in the flight from 
subjective responsibility. Criminal laws now commonly prefer probable consequences as 
defeating actual knowledge, ‘within contemplation’ in place of foresight of certainty, and the 
strange construct of subjective foreseeabilty. 
 
In order that the criminal law ensures its fragile commitment to individual liability, all sorts of 
legislative and judicial travesty have been done to the concept of ‘responsibility’ in practice. 
Community sentiment is translated through the over-bearance of the mind of the ordinary person, 
whose ordinariness is anything but settled. Collective sentiment is not understood as 
organizational cultures or through contribution to the overall criminal enterprise, but mystified 
through participation and complicity and equated with the principal offender. Degrees of 
participation and distance from the offence are conflated for an artificial purpose of punitive 
severity. When the fault element for complicity and the substantive offence differ significantly as 
to knowledge and intention, the degree of compromise over the fault for complicity is at its most 
apparent in the face of political will. The law is now so often satisfied with ‘ought to have’ as 
much as ‘known’. And yet again, the protection of a consistent approach to fault and wrong 
comes back to proof. If the law’s understandings of a consistent and comprehensive process of 
proof were trusted in popular culture and politics (not distorted as with the intoxication defence 
to satisfy moral preference), then the deductive nature of knowledge may be enough to connect it 
with reason and rationality, without such legislative distortion. 
 
In 2000 Andrew Ashworth published a critique intoning ‘Is the criminal law a lost cause?’2 In 
addressing the explosion of criminal legislation in England and Wales in a climate of 
inconsistency,3 Ashworth wondered whether criminal offences could anymore be distinguished 
from other wrongs by reference to content or by procedural and functional distinctions. In an 
effort to make that case he relied on four interlinked principles which he believed to form the 
core of the criminal law:  
 
1. Criminal law should only be used to censure persons for substantial wrong-doing; 
2. Criminal laws should be enforced respectful of equal treatment and proportionality; 
3. Persons accused of substantial wrong-doing ought to be afforded the protections of due 
process (in minimum form as declared in the European Convention on Human Rights); 
4. Maximum sentences and effective sentence levels should be proportionate to the 
seriousness of the wrong-doing. 
 
With these themes Macaulay and all committed codifiers after him, would no doubt have little 
with which to disagree. Principled law-making is not just about consistency, compatibility and 
comprehension. As Leader Elliott suggests in his chapter when examining wrong-doing 
sufficient for criminalization, it is errant not to recognize human rights foundations, even in the 
face of cultural idiosyncrasy. 
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Yet, in recognizing the difficulty of the principled approach to distinguishing modern criminal 
law-making, Ashworth admits that: 
 
Having demonstrated the difficulties in that approach, we move from the descriptive to 
the normative, in search of features for a model of criminal laws which is more 
principled, conceptually more coherent, and constitutionally and politically more 
appropriate. …  
 
What emerges is nothing so concrete as a formula for determining whether or not certain 
conduct should be criminalised. Rather, arguments are presented in favour of a more 
principled development of the criminal law, recognising the essential links between 
procedure, enforcement and sentence. Without a principled approach of this kind, the 
criminal law is likely to remain something of a lost cause.4 
 
These observations surrounding the challenges facing principled criminal law-making (codified 
or otherwise) distil down to the dangerous symbiosis of state interest and criminal law in the 
governing through crime era. Macaulay was no infant when it came to appreciating the 
politicality of the legislative endeavour. In his letter to Lord Auckland, Governor General of 
India, covering his submission of the draft Penal Code, Macaulay observed:  
 
We are perfectly aware that law-givers ought not to disregard even the unreasonable 
prejudices of those for whom they legislate. So sensible are we of the importance of these 
considerations …. The power of constructing the law in cases in which there is any real 
reason to doubt what the law is amounts to the power of making the law. …[W]e are 
confident that your Lordship in Council will not grudge anything that may be necessary 
for the purpose of enabling the people who are placed under your care to know what the 
law is according to which they are required to live.5 
 
Criminal law reform should be concerned about the integrity, durability and the effectiveness of 
the criminal law, enhancing a genuine rule of law rather than facilitating narrow and reactive 
policing impulses. The challenges of principled law reform would be minimized through a tight 
code and a routine and rigorous commitment to re-codification in a climate of continual critical 
reflection concerning the rights and responsibilities of those the law serves. 
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